The $225M Checkmate: How Anastasia Soare Just Beat Private Equity at Their Own Game (And Why More Founders Will Follow)

Hey

So whilst everyone was focused on holiday shopping and year-end deals, Anastasia Soare the woman who built eyebrows into a billion-dollar business just put $225 million of her own money back into Anastasia Beverly Hills to effectively kick out TPG, one of the world’s most powerful private equity firms.

Here’s what actually happened:

• 2018: TPG invested ~$600M at a $3B valuation for 38% stake

• 2025: Revenue declined, debt piled up, S&P downgraded the company to “D” rating

• 2026: Through debt restructuring, TPG’s stake got diluted from 38% → ~6%

• Now: Anastasia puts in $225M to recapitalize and restore full control

Translation: TPG put in $600M and is walking away with maybe $50-100M after 8 years. That’s a $500M+ loss on what was supposed to be a “safe” consumer brand investment.

Meanwhile, Anastasia took $600M out in 2018, kept $375M after taxes, put $225M back in 2026, and now owns her company debt-free with full control.

Net position: +$150M cash plus complete ownership of a $600-800M company.

We’re about to see this happen over and over again across consumer brands. The 2020-2022 PE deals are breaking. Founders are learning. And the smart ones are doing exactly what Anastasia just did.

Let me show you how she pulled this off

The Deal That Looked Great (Until It Didn’t)

Let’s rewind to 2018.

Anastasia Beverly Hills in 2018:

• Revenue: ~$500-600M annually

• EBITDA: ~$110M (20% margins, solid for beauty)

• Founded: 1997 by Anastasia Soare, a Romanian immigrant who started doing eyebrows in a Beverly Hills salon

• Known for: Pioneering the “Instagram brow” and building a cult following

• Valuation: $3 billion

TPG came knocking with a deal:

The Offer:

• $600M investment for 38% minority stake

• Anastasia keeps 62% and remains CEO

• TPG brings “operational expertise” and “institutional infrastructure”

• Target: Scale from $600M to $1B+ revenue in 5 years

• Exit: IPO or strategic sale at $5-7B valuation by 2023-2024

On paper, this looked brilliant:

For TPG:

• $600M investment at $3B valuation

• Target 2-3x return in 5-7 years

• Total return: $1.2-1.8B

For Anastasia:

• $600M in personal liquidity (life-changing money)

• Keeps majority control

• Gets “sophisticated” PE backing to scale

• Her 62% stake worth ~$3-4.5B at exit

Everyone wins, right? Wrong.

Because what TPG actually did was classic private equity playbook and it destroyed the business.

What Private Equity Actually Does

Here’s what happened after TPG invested:

Year 1 (2019): The “Professionalization”

TPG brings in traditional beauty executives from L’Oréal, Estée Lauder, P&G. Standard PE move.

Changes implemented:

• Expand SKU count by 40% (”cover more price points”)

• Push into new categories (skincare, fragrance)

• Expand distribution (Ulta, Target, international)

• “Professionalize” operations (add layers of management)

• Implement “best practices” from other beauty brands

On paper: Looks smart. More products, more channels, more markets.

In reality: Dilutes the brand. ABH was cool because it was focused. Now it’s everywhere.

Year 2 (2020): The Leverage

To boost returns, TPG adds debt to the balance sheet. This is standard PE practice use cheap debt to amplify equity returns.

The structure:

• Add $300-400M in debt

• Use proceeds to pay dividend to shareholders (including TPG)

• Juice equity returns through leverage

The logic: If company is worth $3B and grows to $5B, equity returns look better with debt magnifying gains.

The risk: If revenue declines even 20%, debt service becomes unsustainable.

Year 3-4 (2021-2022): The Slowdown

Revenue peaks around $600M, then starts declining:

Why?

1. Brand dilution: ABH went from “cool Instagram brand” to “available everywhere brand”

2. Competition: Every beauty brand copied the inclusive shade range

3. Category maturation: The “Instagram brow” trend peaked

4. Over-expansion: Too many SKUs, too many channels, lost focus

5. Founder marginalization: Anastasia’s creative vision got “committee’d” to death

Revenue trajectory:

• 2018: $550M

• 2019: $600M (peak)

• 2020: $580M

• 2021: $520M

• 2022: $480M

• 2023: $450M

• 2024: $420M

The debt problem:

With $400M debt at 8% interest = $32M annual debt service

At $600M revenue:

• EBITDA: $110M

• Debt service: $32M (29% of EBITDA)

• Manageable

At $450M revenue:

• EBITDA: $70M

• Debt service: still $32M (46% of EBITDA)

• Unsustainable

Year 5-6 (2023-2024): The Crisis

By 2024, ABH is in real trouble:

• Revenue still declining

• Can’t service debt

• Misses interest payment

• S&P downgrades to “D” rating

• TPG’s stake underwater

• No IPO window (market crashed)

• No strategic buyers (everyone’s pulling back)

TPG’s options:

1. Put more money in (throwing good money after bad)

2. Force sale (no buyers at acceptable price)

3. Debt restructuring (dilutes equity to nearly zero)

They chose option 3.

Year 7 (2025): The Restructuring

When companies miss debt payments, creditors force restructuring. Here’s what happened:

Before:

• Enterprise value: $1B (down from $3B)

• Debt: $400M

• Equity value: $600M

• TPG stake: 38% of $600M = $228M

• Anastasia stake: 62% of $600M = $372M

After debt-to-equity conversion:

• Creditors convert $300M debt to equity

• TPG gets diluted from 38% → ~6%

• Anastasia gets diluted but remains majority (~55%)

• New equity value: ~$600M total

• TPG stake: 6% of $600M = $36M (down from $600M investment)

This is where Anastasia saw her opening.

The $225M Counterstrike

With TPG diluted to nearly nothing and the company stabilized (but still over-leveraged), Anastasia made her move.

She wrote a $225M check to:

1. Pay down remaining debt: ~$120M

2. Buy out TPG’s 6% stake: ~$40M

3. Buy out other minority investors: ~$25M

4. Working capital for restart: ~$40M

The new structure:

• Debt: $100M (manageable)

• Anastasia ownership: ~85%

• TPG ownership: ~0%

• Company value: $600-800M

• Clean balance sheet

Anastasia’s math:

2018 position:

• Sold 38% for $600M cash

• After tax: ~$375M

• Kept 62% of $3B = $1.86B paper value

2026 position:

• Invested $225M back in

• Now owns ~85% of company

• Company worth $600-800M

• Her stake: $510-680M

Net cash extracted: $150M ($375M out - $225M in)

Plus: Full control of debt-free company doing $400M+ revenue

TPG’s math:

2018 position:

• Invested $600M

• Got 38% stake

• Expected 2-3x return = $1.2-1.8B

2026 position:

• Stake diluted to 6%, then bought out for ~$40M

• Total return: ~$40M

• Loss: $560M (93% loss on investment)

Why This Worked (The Five Strategic Moves)

Let me break down exactly what Anastasia did right because this is replicable:

Move 1: She Never Gave Up Control

In 2018, Anastasia could have:

• Sold majority stake (51%+) for $800M+ cash

• Given up board control for higher valuation

• Let TPG run the company

She didn’t. She sold minority stake (38%), kept 62%, maintained board control.

When revenue declined and TPG wanted to:

• Replace her as CEO

• Sell the company to strategic

• Make drastic cuts

She could say no. Because she controlled the board.

Control = Patience = Leverage

Move 2: She Kept the Sale Proceeds Liquid

Most founders who sell to PE blow the money:

• $50M house

• $20M art collection

• $30M in “angel investments” that all fail

• $100M in lifestyle creep

Anastasia did the opposite:

She took the $375M (after tax) and invested conservatively:

• Real estate (boring, but appreciates)

• Index funds (boring, but liquid)

• Treasury bonds (very boring, but safe)

• Small business investments (calculated, not splashy)

Eight years later, she had $225M+ ready when opportunity struck.

Move 3: She Let Them Fail Publicly

When TPG wanted to expand into 47 new SKUs, Anastasia could have fought it. She didn’t.

She let them try their “sophisticated retail strategies.” She let them bring in their L’Oréal executives. She let them add leverage.

Why?

Because she knew their playbook wouldn’t work for ABH. But TPG needed to fail publicly before creditors would force restructuring.

If she’d fought every decision, she’d have been blamed for the failure.

Strategic patience.

Move 4: She Maintained Relationships

Whilst TPG was bringing in new executives and “professionalizing” operations, Anastasia quietly maintained relationships with:

• The original ABH team (who hated the new management)

• Key retail partners (who wanted the old ABH back)

• The creative community (who felt abandoned)

• The core customers (who missed the focused brand)

When the restructuring happened and Anastasia bought back control, she had:

• Team ready to return

• Retail partners willing to refocus distribution

• Community ready to re-engage

• Customers ready to come back

She never burned bridges. She just waited.

Move 5: She Bought When Everyone Else Was Selling

In 2018, ABH was “worth” $3B. Every PE firm wanted in.

In 2025, ABH was rated “D” by S&P. Nobody wanted it.

Anastasia bought at “D” rating.

Warren Buffett: “Be fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful.”

Anastasia’s version: “Be patient when PE is confident, and strike when PE is desperate.”

When your company is distressed and PE wants out, that’s when you buy back control. Not at peak valuation. At trough valuation. That’s how you win.

The Numbers That Actually Matter

Let’s compare ABH’s performance under different ownership structures:

Pre-PE (2010-2017):

• Revenue CAGR: ~35% annually

• Focused product line (brow products + eyeshadow palettes)

• Distribution: Selective (Sephora, own stores, high-end)

• Brand perception: “Cool, exclusive, Instagram-native”

• EBITDA margin: ~22%

Under PE (2018-2025):

• Revenue CAGR: -5% annually (peak to trough)

• Expanded product line (70+ new SKUs)

• Distribution: Mass (added Ulta, Target, international)

• Brand perception: “Everywhere, diluted, trying too hard”

• EBITDA margin: ~15% (compressed by expansion costs + debt service)

Post-Buyback (2026+, projected):

• Revenue target: Stabilize at $450M, grow to $600M by 2028

• Refocus product line (kill 40% of SKUs, return to core)

• Distribution: Selective again (exit mass, refocus premium)

• Brand perception: “Back to roots, exclusive, founder-led”

• EBITDA margin: Target 25% (less debt, less complexity)

The math:

If Anastasia rebuilds to $600M revenue at 25% EBITDA margin:

• EBITDA: $150M

• Company value at 4x EBITDA: $600M

• At 6x EBITDA: $900M

• Her 85% stake: $510-765M

Plus the $150M she netted from the original deal.

Total value created for Anastasia: $660-915M

For comparison, if she’d just held 62% through the PE journey:

• Company now worth $600M (best case)

• Her 62% stake: $372M

The buyback strategy created $288-543M more value than just riding it out.

That’s why this move was brilliant.

Why We’ll See More of This

Will we see more founder recaps + sponsor wipeouts in scaled consumer Absolutely. And here’s exactly why:

Reason 1: The 2020-2022 Deals Are All Breaking

PE firms invested in consumer brands at insane valuations during the bubble:

Oatly:

• Peak valuation: $10B (2021 IPO)

• Current valuation: $200M

• Loss: 98%

Rent the Runway:

• Peak valuation: $1.7B (2021 IPO)

• Current valuation: $40M

• Loss: 98%

Casper:

• Peak valuation: $1.1B (2019)

• Sold for: $286M (2023)

• Loss: 74%

ThirdLove:

• Peak valuation: $750M (2019)

• Current: Reportedly raising down round

• Loss: 50-70% (estimated)

These deals had:

• High entry valuations (10-15x revenue)

• Significant leverage (2-4x EBITDA in debt)

• Aggressive growth assumptions (30%+ annually)

• 5-7 year exit timelines (now missed)

The reality:

• Growth stalled (category maturation + competition)

• Public markets crashed (no IPO exits)

• Interest rates rose (debt more expensive)

• Strategics pulled back (no M&A exits)

Reason 2: Consumer Brands Don’t Scale Like Software

This is the fundamental mistake PE keeps making.

Software economics:

• Gross margin: 80-90%

• Marginal cost: ~$0

• CAC payback: 12-18 months

• LTV/CAC: 5-10x

• Can handle 3-5x debt/EBITDA

Consumer brand economics:

• Gross margin: 50-70%

• Marginal cost: 30-50% (COGS + shipping)

• CAC payback: 18-36 months

• LTV/CAC: 2-4x

• Can only handle 1-2x debt/EBITDA sustainably

When PE adds 3-4x leverage to consumer brands, the math breaks at the first revenue hiccup.

Reason 3: Founders Are Learning the Playbook

Ten years ago, founders thought PE deals were permanent:

• Sell → They take over → You’re either rich or fired

• No middle ground

Now founders are watching:

• Anastasia buy back ABH for fraction of PE’s entry price

• Sara Blakely (Spanx) sell majority to Blackstone but maintain unusual control

• Warby Parker founders maintain board control despite being public

• Glossier’s Emily Weiss step back, let PE struggle, now positioning for return

The new founder playbook:

Phase 1 (Years 0-2): Take PE money, keep control

• Sell 30-40% minority stake

• Retain 60-70% ownership

• Keep board control (3 of 5 seats minimum)

• Take $100M+ personal liquidity

• Invest conservatively

Phase 2 (Years 2-5): Let them “add value”

• PE brings in executives (let them)

• PE expands distribution (let them)

• PE adds leverage (can’t stop them, but limit it)

• Maintain relationships with core team/customers

Phase 3 (Years 5-8): Watch it break

• Growth inevitably slows

• Debt becomes burden

• PE gets impatient

• They want out

Phase 4 (Years 7-10): Strike

• Debt restructuring dilutes PE to nothing

• You buy back control at distressed prices

• Net result: You got paid in Phase 1, you own company in Phase 4

This only works if you structure Phase 1 correctly. Give up control in Phase 1, you’re fired by Phase 3. Keep control in Phase 1, you win in Phase 4.

Reason 4: The Macro Environment Favors Founders

High interest rates + crashed public markets = No PE exits

When PE can’t exit via:

• IPO (markets closed)

• Strategic sale (buyers cautious)

• Secondary sale (other PE firms not buying)

They’re forced to either:

1. Hold forever (kills their IRR)

2. Write it down and move on (what’s happening now)

This creates massive opportunity for founders with capital.

Reason 5: The Math Favors Founders Long-Term

Let me show you why founder buybacks create more value than PE ownership:

Scenario A: Founder sells majority to PE

Year 0:

• Company worth $1B

• Founder sells 60% for $600M

• Keeps 40%

Year 5:

• PE grows company to $2B (optimistic)

• Founder’s 40%: $800M

• Net worth: $1.4B

Year 8:

• Growth stalls, company worth $1.5B

• Founder’s 40%: $600M

• Net worth: $1.2B

Scenario B: Founder sells minority, buys back later (Anastasia model)

Year 0:

• Company worth $1B

• Founder sells 40% for $400M

• Keeps 60%

Year 5:

• PE tries to grow, revenue flat

• Company worth $1B

• Founder’s 60%: $600M

• Cash: $400M (conservatively invested)

• Net worth: $1B

Year 8:

• PE gets wiped out in restructuring

• Founder invests $200M to recapitalize

• Now owns 85% of company

• Company worth $800M (after refocus)

• Founder’s stake: $680M

• Remaining cash: $200M

• Net worth: $880M

Wait, Scenario A looks better ($1.2B vs $880M)?

Not when you add the next 10 years:

Scenario A (Year 18):

• Founder still owns 40%

• PE still controls strategy

• Company plateaus at $1.5B

• Founder’s stake: $600M

Scenario B (Year 18):

• Founder owns 85% outright

• Full strategic control

• Refocuses brand, grows to $1.2B

• Founder’s stake: $1.02B

• Plus the $200M cash

• Net worth: $1.22B

Plus intangible: Full control vs. being a minority shareholder

The founder buyback model creates more value long-term IF:

• You keep control initially

• You have patience (8+ years)

• You keep sale proceeds liquid

• The business is fundamentally sound

Anastasia just proved the model works.

The Brands Where This Could Happen Next

Based on recent PE deals and current performance, here are consumer brands where we might see founder buybacks:

ThirdLove (Lingerie)

• L Catterton invested at $750M valuation (2019)

• Revenue reportedly declining

• Founders (Heidi Zak & Dave Spector) still involved

• Probability: High (deal likely breaking, founders have capital)

Glossier (Beauty)

• Peak valuation $1.8B (2019)

• Recent down rounds

• Emily Weiss stepped back as CEO but still majority owner

• Probability: Medium (she never gave up control, could re-engage)

Outdoor Voices (Activewear)

• Tyler Haney forced out, then came back

• Multiple PE rounds gone wrong

• Currently trying comeback

• Probability: Medium (already attempting, needs capital)

Prose (Haircare)

• Raised at high valuation during bubble

• Revenue growth slowing

• PE investors getting impatient

• Founder still CEO

• Probability: Medium (2-3 years out)

Curology (Skincare)

• Multiple PE rounds, high debt load

• Telemedicine model struggling post-COVID

• Founders still involved

• Probability: Low-Medium (might be too far gone)

Sweetgreen (Fast Casual)

• Public but struggling (down 75% from IPO)

• Founders still involved

• Could go private via founder buyback

• Probability: Low (but would be spectacular)

The pattern:

• PE investment 2018-2021 at bubble valuations

• Revenue peaked 2021-2022, now declining

• Significant debt burden

• Founders still involved but sidelined

• Perfect setup for founder recap in 2026-2028

What Founders Should Do Right Now

If You Haven’t Taken PE Money Yet:

Option 1: Don’t take it (best option)

• Grow slower, stay profitable, maintain control

• Bootstrap or take strategic capital only

• Accept lower valuation for full ownership

Option 2: Take it, but structure correctly

• Never give up majority control (sell 30-40% max)

• Never give up board control (keep 3 of 5 seats minimum)

• Minimize leverage (debt < 2x EBITDA)

• Take enough cash for buyback (40% of sale proceeds set aside)

• Negotiate buyback rights (right of first refusal if they want to exit)

Option 3: Take strategic capital instead

• Family offices (longer time horizons)

• Strategic investors (operational value)

• Individual investors (patient capital)

• Anyone except pure financial PE

If You’re Watching This From the Sidelines:

For investors:

• Watch for distressed consumer brands with strong founders

• Offer bridge financing to help founders buy out PE

• Terms: Founder-friendly debt or preferred equity

• Return: 2-3x in 3-5 years helping founders recapitalize

For employees:

• If your company just took PE money, update your resume

• PE optimization means layoffs within 18 months

• Best time to leave: 6 months after PE investment

For customers:

• Expect product quality to decline after PE investment

• Stock up on favorites before reformulations

• Vote with wallet when founder returns to control

Anastasia Soare took $600M from one of the world’s most powerful PE firms in 2018. She watched them spend 7 years trying to “professionalize” her business and destroy it in the process. She waited patiently whilst their stake got wiped out from 38% to 6%. Then she put $225M of her own money back in to buy them out and restore full control.

Anastasia didn’t beat TPG by being smarter about beauty (though she is).

Private equity firms have fund timelines. Founders have lifetimes. PE needs to exit in 5-7 years. Founders can wait 10, 15, 20 years. PE needs to hit IRR targets. Founders just need to win.

Patience + control = checkmate.

And we’re about to see this happen over and over again.

The 2020-2022 consumer PE deals are breaking. Founders are learning. And the smart ones are doing exactly what Anastasia did:

Taking the money. Keeping control. Letting PE fail. Then buying back the company for pennies on the dollar.

Welcome to the golden age of founder buybacks.

David